Abstract. Nicod's criterion states that observing a black raven is evidence for the hypothesis H that all ravens are black. We show that Solomonoff induction does not satisfy Nicod's criterion: there are time steps in which observing black ravens decreases the belief in H. Moreover, while observing any computable infinite string compatible with H, the belief in H decreases infinitely often when using the unnormalized Solomonoff prior, but only finitely often when using the normalized Solomonoff prior. We argue that the fault is not with Solomonoff induction; instead we should reject Nicod's criterion.
Introduction
Inductive inference, how to generalize from examples, is the cornerstone of scientific investigation. But we cannot justify the use of induction on the grounds that it has reliably worked before, because this argument presupposes induction. Instead, we need to give deductive (logical) arguments for the use of induction. Today we know a formal solution to the problem of induction: Solomonoff's theory of learning [16, 17] , also known as universal induction or Solomonoff induction. It is a method of induction based on Bayesian inference [9] and algorithmic probability [11] . Because it is solidly founded in abstract mathematics, it can be justified purely deductively.
Solomonoff defines a prior probability distribution M that assigns to a string x the probability that a universal monotone Turing machine prints something starting with x when fed with fair coin flips. Solomonoff's prior encompasses Ockham's razor by favoring simple explanations over complex ones: algorithmically simple strings have short programs and are thus assigned higher probability than complex strings that do not have short programs. Moreover, Solomonoff's prior respects Epicurus' principle of multiple explanation by never discarding possible explanations: any possible program that explains the string contributes to the probability [8] .
For data drawn from a computable probability distribution µ, Solomonoff induction will converge to the correct belief about any hypothesis [1] . Moreover,
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this can be used to produce reliable predictions extremely fast: Solomonoff induction will make a total of at most E + O( √ E) errors when predicting the next data points, where E is the number of errors of the informed predictor that knows µ [7] . In this sense, Solomonoff induction solves the induction problem [15] . It is incomputable, hence it can only serve as an ideal that any practical learning algorithm should strive to approximate.
But does Solomonoff induction live up to this ideal? Suppose we entertain the hypothesis H that all ravens are black. Since this is a universally quantified statement, it is refuted by observing one counterexample: a non-black raven. But at any time step, we have observed only a finite number of the potentially infinite number of possible cases. Nevertheless, Solomonoff induction maximally confirms the hypothesis H asymptotically. This paper is motivated by a problem of inductive inference extensively discussed in the literature: the paradox of confirmation, also known as Hempel's paradox [5] . It relies on the following three principles.
-Nicod's criterion [14, p. 67] : observing an F that is a G increases our belief in the hypothesis that all F s are Gs. -The equivalence condition: logically equivalent hypothesis are confirmed or disconfirmed by the same evidence. -The paradoxical conclusion: a green apple confirms H.
The argument goes as follows. The hypothesis H is logically equivalent to the hypothesis H that all non-black objects are non-ravens. According to Nicod's criterion, any non-black non-raven, such as a green apple, confirms H . But then the equivalence condition entails the paradoxical conclusion.
The paradox of confirmation has been discussed extensively in the literature on the philosophy of science [5, 2, 12, 3, 6, 13, 19] ; see [18] for a survey. Support for Nicod's criterion is not uncommon [12, 6, 13] and no consensus is in sight.
Using results from algorithmic information theory we show that Solomonoff induction avoids the paradoxical conclusion because it does not fulfill Nicod's criterion. There are time steps when (counterfactually) observing a black raven disconfirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black (Theorem 7 and Corollary 12). In the deterministic setting Nicod's criterion is even violated infinitely often (Theorem 8 and Corollary 13). However, if we normalize Solomonoff's prior and observe a deterministic computable infinite string, Nicod's criterion is violated at most finitely many times (Theorem 11). Our results are independent of the choice of the universal Turing machine. A list of notation can be found on page 15.
Preliminaries
Let X be some finite set called alphabet. The set X * := ∞ n=0 X n is the set of all finite strings over the alphabet X , and the set X ∞ is the set of all infinite strings over the alphabet X . The empty string is denoted by , not to be confused with the small positive rational number ε. Given a string x ∈ X * , we denote its length by |x|. For a (finite or infinite) string x of length ≥ k, we denote with x 1:k the first k characters of x, and with x <k the first k − 1 characters of x. The notation x 1:∞ stresses that x is an infinite string. We write x y iff x is a prefix of y, i.e., x = y 1:|x| .
A semimeasure over the alphabet X is a probability measure on the probability space X := X * ∪ X ∞ whose σ-algebra is generated by the cylinder sets Γ x := {xz | z ∈ X } [11, Ch. 4.2] . If a semimeasure assigns zero probability to every finite string, then it is called a measure. Measures and semimeasures are uniquely defined by their values on cylinder sets. For convenience we identify a string x ∈ X * with its cylinder set Γ x .
For two functions f, g : X * → R we use the notation f 
Proof. Define ν(x) := M (x), if x ∈ E, and 0, otherwise.
The semimeasure ν is lower semicomputable because E is recursively enumerable. Furthermore, x∈X * ν(x) ≤ 1 because M is a semimeasure and E is prefix-free. Therefore ν is a discrete semimeasure. Hence there are constant c and c such that
Lemma 2 ([11, Sec. 4.5.7] ). For any computable measure µ the set of µ-Martin-Löf-random sequences has µ-probability one:
Solomonoff and the Black Ravens
Setup. In order to formalize the black raven problem (in line with [15, Sec. 7 .4]), we define two predicates: blackness B and ravenness R. There are four possible observations: a black raven BR, a non-black raven BR, a black non-raven BR, and a non-black non-raven BR. Therefore our alphabet consists of four symbols corresponding to each of the possible observations, X := {BR, BR, BR, BR}. We will not make the formal distinction between observations and the symbols that represent them, and simply use both interchangeably. We are interested in the hypothesis 'all ravens are black'. Formally, it corresponds to the set
the set of all finite and infinite strings in which the symbol BR does not occur. Let H c := X \ H be the complement hypothesis 'there is at least one non-black raven'. We fix the definition of H and H c for the rest of this paper. Using Solomonoff induction, our prior belief in the hypothesis H is
the cumulative weight of all programs that do not print any non-black ravens.
In each time step t, we make one observation x t ∈ X . Our history x <t = x 1 x 2 . . . x t−1 is the sequence of all previous observations. We update our belief with Bayes' rule in accordance with the Bayesian framework for learning [9] : our posterior belief in the hypothesis H is
We say that the observation x t confirms the hypothesis
, and we say that the observation x t disconfirms the hypothesis
t ) = 0, we say that H is refuted, and if M (H | x 1:t ) → 1 as t → ∞, we say that H is (maximally) confirmed asymptotically.
Confirmation and Refutation. Let the sequence x 1:∞ be sampled from a computable measure µ, the true environment. If we observe a non-black raven, x t = BR, the hypothesis H is refuted since H ∩ x 1:t = ∅ and this implies M (H | x 1:t ) = 0. In this case, our enquiry regarding H is settled. For the rest of this paper, we focus on the interesting case: we assume our hypothesis H is in fact true in µ (µ(H) = 1), i.e., µ does not generate any non-black ravens. Since Solomonoff's prior M dominates all computable measures, there is a constant
Thus Blackwell and Dubins' famous merging of opinions theorem [1] implies
Therefore our hypothesis H is confirmed asymptotically [15, Sec. 7.4] . However, convergence to 1 is extremely slow, slower than any unbounded computable function, since 1
for all t. In our setup, the equivalence condition holds trivially: a logically equivalent way of formulating a hypothesis yields the same set of infinite strings, therefore in our formalization it constitutes the same hypothesis. The central question of this paper is Nicod's criterion, which refers to the assertion that BR and BR confirm
Disconfirming H
We first illustrate the violation of Nicod's criterion by defining a particular universal Turing machine.
Example 3 (Black Raven Disconfirms). The observation of a black raven can falsify a short program that supported the hypothesis H. Let ε > 0 be a small rational number. We define a semimeasure ρ as follows. To get a universally dominant semimeasure ξ, we mix ρ with the universally dominant semimeasure M .
For computable ε, the mixture ξ is a lower semicomputable semimeasure. Hence there is a universal monotone Turing machine whose Solomonoff prior is equal to ξ [20, Lem. 13]. Our a priori belief in H at time t = 0 is
while our a posteriori belief in H after seeing a black raven is
for ε ≤ 7%. Hence observing a black raven in the first time step disconfirms the hypothesis H. ♦
The rest of this section is dedicated to show that this effect occurs independent of the universal Turing machine U and on all computable infinite strings.
Setup
At time step t, we have seen the history x <t and now update our belief using the new symbol x t . To understand what happens, we split all possible programs into five categories.
(a) Programs that never print non-black ravens (compatible with H), but become falsified at time step t because they print a symbol other than x t . (b) Programs that eventually print a non-black raven (contradict H), but become falsified at time step t because they print a symbol other than x t . (c) Programs that never print non-black ravens (compatible with H), and predict x t correctly.
(d) Programs that eventually print a non-black raven (contradict H), and predict x t correctly. (e) Programs that do not print additional symbols after printing x <t (because they go into an infinite loop).
Let A, B, C, D, and E denote the cumulative contributions of these five categories of programs to M . A formal definition is given in Figure 1 , and implicitly depends on the current time step t and the observed string x 1:t . The values of A, B, C, D, and E are in the interval [0, 1] since they are probabilities. Moreover, the following holds.
We use results from algorithmic information theory to derive bounds on A, B, C, D, and E. This lets us apply the following lemma which states a necessary and sufficient condition for confirmation/disconfirmation at time step t.
Lemma 4 (Confirmation Criterion). Observing x t confirms (disconfirms) the hypothesis H if and only if AD + DE < BC (AD + DE > BC).

Proof. The hypothesis H is confirmed if and only if
is positive. Since the denominator is positive, this is equivalent to BC > AD + DE.
Example 5 (Confirmation Criterion Applied to Example 3). In Example 3 we picked a particular universal prior and x 1 = BR. In this case, the values for A, B, C, D, and E are
We invoke Lemma 4 with ε := 7% to get that x 1 = BR disconfirms H:
Lemma 6 (Bounds on ABCDE)
. Let x 1:∞ ∈ H be some computable infinite string. The following statements hold for every time step t.
Proof. Let p be a program that computes the infinite string x 1:∞ .
(i) Each of A, B, C, D, E is a probability value and hence bounded between 0 and 1. These bounds are strict because for any finite string there is a program that prints that string. (ii) A proof is given in the appendix of [8] . Let a = x t and let q be the shortest program for the string x <t a, i.e., |q| = Km(x <t a). We can reconstruct t by running p and q in parallel and counting the number of characters printed until their output differs. Therefore there is a constant c independent of t such that K(t) ≤ |p| + |q| + c = |p| + Km(x <t a) + c. Hence
The set E := {x <t a | t ∈ N, a = x t } is recursively enumerable and prefixfree, so Lemma 1 yields a constant c E such that
With A + B ≤ (#X − 1) max a =xt M (x <t a) follows the claim. (iii) Let a = x t and let q be the shortest program to compute t, i.e., |q| = K(t).
We can construct a program that prints x <t aBR by first running q to get t and then running p until it has produced a string of length t − 1, and then printing aBR. Hence there is a constant c independent of t such that Km(x <t aBR) ≤ |q| + |p| + c = K(t) + |p| + c. Therefore
For the bound on M (x <t a∩H) we proceed analogously except that instead of printing BR the program goes into an infinite loop. (iv) Since by assumption the program p computes x 1:∞ ∈ H, we have that M (x 1:t ∩ H) ≥ 2 −|p| . (v) Let n be an integer such that K(n) = m(t). We proceed analogously to (iii) with a program q that prints n such that |q| = m(t). Next, we write a program that produces the output x 1:n BR, which yields a constant c independent of t such that
(vi) This follows from Blackwell and Dubins' result (4):
Lemma 6 states the bounds that illustrate the ideas to our results informally:
According to Lemma 4, the sign of AD + DE − BC tells us whether our belief in H increases (negative) or decreases (positive). Since D → 0 (vi), the term AD × = 2 −K(t) D will eventually be smaller than BC × = 2 −K(t) . Therefore it is crucial how fast E → 0 (vii). If we use M , then E → 0 slower than D → 0 (v), therefore AD+DE−BC is positive infinitely often (Theorem 8). If we use M norm instead of M , then E = 0 and hence AD + DE − BC = AD − BC is negative except for a finite number of steps (Theorem 11).
Unnormalized Solomonoff Prior
Theorem 7 (Counterfactual Black Raven Disconfirms H). Let x 1:∞ be a computable infinite string such that x 1:∞ ∈ H (x 1:∞ does not contain any non-black ravens) and x t = BR infinitely often. Then there is a time step t ∈ N (with
Proof. Let t be time step such that x t = BR. From the proof of Lemma 6 (iii) we get M (H c ∩ x <t BR) ≥ 2 −K(t)−c and thus
From (4) there is a t 0 such that for all t ≥ t 0 we have
. Since x t = BR infinitely often according to the assumption, there is a x t = BR for t ≥ t 0 .
Note that the black raven in Theorem 7 that we observe at time t is counterfactual, i.e., not part of the sequence x 1:∞ . If we picked the binary alphabet {BR, BR} and denoted only observations of ravens, then Theorem 7 would not apply: the only infinite string in H is BR ∞ and the only counterfactual observation is BR, which immediately falsifies the hypothesis H. The following theorem gives an on-sequence result.
Theorem 8 (Disconfirmation Infinitely Often for M ). Let x 1:∞ be a computable infinite string such that x 1:∞ ∈ H (x 1:∞ does not contain any non-black ravens). Then M (H | x 1:t ) < M (H | x <t ) for infinitely many time steps t ∈ N.
Proof. We show that there are infinitely many n ∈ N such that for each n there is a time step t > n where the belief in H decreases. The ns are picked to have low Kolmogorov complexity, while the ts are incompressible. The crucial insight is that a program that goes into an infinite loop at time t only needs to know n and not t, thus making this program much smaller than K(t) ≥ log t.
Let q n be a program that starting with t = n + 1 incrementally outputs x 1:t as long as K(t) < log t. Formally, let φ(y, k) be a computable function such that φ(y, k + 1) ≤ φ(y, k) and lim k→∞ φ(y, k) = K(y).
program q n :
t := n + 1 output x <t while true : k := 0 while φ(t, k) ≥ log t :
The program q n only needs to know p and n, so we have that |q n | ≤ K(n) + c for some constant c independent of n and t. For the smallest t > n with K(t) ≥ log t, the program q n will go into an infinite loop and thus fail to print a t-th character. Therefore
Incompressible numbers are very dense, and a simple counting argument shows that there must be one between n and 4n [11, Thm. 3.3.1 (i)]. Furthermore, we can assume that n is large enough such that m(4n) ≤ m(n)+1 (since m grows slower than the logarithm). Then
Since the function m grows slower than any unbounded computable function, we find infinitely many n such that
where c and c are the constants from Lemma 6 (ii,v). For each such n, there is a t > n with K(t) ≥ log t, as discussed above. This entails
≤ 2K(n) + 1 + c + c
From Lemma 6 we get
With Lemma 4 we conclude that x t disconfirms H.
To get that M violates Nicod's criterion infinitely often, we apply Theorem 8 to the computable infinite string BR ∞ .
Normalized Solomonoff Prior
In this section we show that for computable infinite strings, our belief in the hypothesis H is non-increasing at most finitely many times if we normalize M . For this section we define A , B , C , D , and E analogous to A, B, C, D, and E as given in Figure 1 with M norm instead of M .
Interestingly, Theorem 11 does not hold for M since that would contradict Theorem 8. The reason is that there are quite short programs that produce x <t , but do not halt after that. However, from p and x <t we cannot reconstruct t, hence a program for x <t does not give us a bound on K(t).
Since we get the same bounds for M norm as in Lemma 6, the result of Theorem 7 transfers to M norm :
Corollary 12 (Counterfactual Black Raven Disconfirms H). Let x 1:∞ be a computable infinite string such that x 1:∞ ∈ H (x 1:∞ does not contain any non-black ravens) and x t = BR infinitely often. Then there is a time step t ∈ N (with
For incomputable infinite strings the belief in H can decrease infinitely often:
Corollary 13 (Disconfirmation Infinitely Often for M norm ). There is an (incomputable) infinite string
Proof. We iterate Corollary 12: starting with BR ∞ , we get a time step t 1 such that observing BR at time t 1 disconfirms H. We set x 1:t1 := BR t1−1 BR and apply Corollary 12 to x 1:t1 BR ∞ to get a time step t 2 such that observing BR at time t 2 disconfirms H. Then we set x 1:t2 := x 1:t1 BR t2−t1−1 BR, and so on.
Stochastically Sampled Strings
The proof techniques from the previous subsections do not generalize to strings that are sampled stochastically. The main obstacle is the complexity of counterfactual observations x <t a with a = x t : for deterministic strings Km(x <t a) → 0, while for stochastically sampled strings Km(x <t a) 0. Consider the following example. −t 2 −m(t) with λ H -probability one. According to Lemma 4, the sign of AD + DE − BC is indicative for the change in belief in H. But this is inconclusive both for M and M norm since each of the summands AD, BC, and DE (in case E = 0) go to zero at the same rate:
Whether H gets confirmed or disconfirmed thus depends on the universal Turing machine and/or the probabilistic outcome of the string drawn from λ H . ♦
We chose to present our results in the setting of the black raven problem to make them more accessible to intuition and more relatable to existing literature. But these results hold more generally: our proofs follow from the bounds on A, B, C, D, and E given in Lemma 6 and Lemma 10. These bounds rely on the fact that we are observing a computable infinite string and that at any time step t there are programs consistent with the observation history that contradict the hypothesis and there are programs consistent with the observation history that are compatible with the hypothesis. No further assumptions on the alphabet, the hypothesis H, or the universal Turing machine are necessary. In our formalization of the raven problem given in Section 3, we used an alphabet with four symbols. Each symbol indicates one of four possible types of observations according to the two binary predicates blackness and ravenness. One could object that this formalization discards important structure from the problem: BR and BR have more in common than BR and BR, yet as symbols they are all the same. Instead, we could use the latin alphabet and spell out 'black', 'non-black', 'raven', and 'non-raven'. The results given in this paper would still apply analogously.
Our result that Solomonoff induction does not satisfy Nicod's criterion is not true for every time step, only for some of them. Generally, whether Nicod's criterion should be adhered to depends on whether the paradoxical conclusion is acceptable. A different Bayesian reasoner might be tempted to argue that a green apple does confirm the hypothesis H, but only to a small degree, since there are vastly more non-black objects than ravens [2] . This leads to the acceptance of the paradoxical conclusion, and this solution to the confirmation paradox is known as the standard Bayesian solution. It is equivalent to the assertion that blackness is equally probable regardless of whether H holds: P (black|H) ≈ P (black) [19] . Whether or not this holds depends on our prior beliefs.
The following is a very concise example against the standard Bayesian solution [3] : There are two possible worlds, the first has 100 black ravens and a million other birds, while the second has 1000 black ravens, one white raven, and a million other birds. Now we draw a bird uniformly at random, and it turns out to be a black raven. Contrary to what Nicod's criterion claims, this is strong evidence that we are in fact in the second world, and in this world non-black ravens exist.
For another, more intuitive example: Suppose you do not know anything about ravens and you have a friend who collects atypical objects. If you see a black raven in her collection, surely this would not increase your belief in the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
We must conclude that violating Nicod's criterion is not a fault of Solomonoff induction. Instead, we should accept that for Bayesian reasoning Nicod's criterion, in its generality, is false! Quoting the great Bayesian master E. T. Jaynes [9, p. 144 ]:
In the literature there are perhaps 100 'paradoxes' and controversies which are like this, in that they arise from faulty intuition rather than faulty mathematics. Someone asserts a general principle that seems to him intuitively right. Then, when probability analysis reveals the error, instead of taking this opportunity to educate his intuition, he reacts by rejecting the probability analysis.
